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I. INTRODUCTION
For as long as environmental law has existed, critics of the
regulatory system have called for fundamental reforms. The
Supreme Court's decision in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc.,2 may have marked the end of one stage in this de-
bate over regulatory reform. The Court was unmoved by the
longstanding argument that cost-benefit analysis should deter-
mine air quality standards. It also laid to rest the claim that
the Clean Air Act gave the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") too much open-ended authority, resulting in an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power. Although the Court's
decision was not surprising, advocates of structural change in
environmental law will now have to address their complaints to
Congress. For the present, at least, the Court has put its impri-
matur on the current regulatory system. As one disappointed
critic of EPA complained, "cost-benefit analysis has taken a con-
siderable hit," and its supporters "will just have to lick their
wounds ."3
The debate over regulatory reform will no doubt continue.
To date, much of the debate has been warped by a failure to
appreciate the realities of environmental regulation. The de-
bate so far has focused on how EPA creates environmental stan-
dards. However, the debate has overlooked how those
standards are transmuted in the course of implementation, ren-
dering much of the debate over the creation of the standards
unrealistic.
2. 2531 U.S. 457 (2001). See Lisa Schulz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation
After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 469-72
(2002) for a brief summary of the case. A fuller explanation of the complicated
regulatory context can be found in William V. Luneburg, Clean Air Act Implemen-
tation and the Impact of Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 63 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 1 (2001). For convenience of reference, the following case designa-
tions will be used in this article: the term "American Trucking" will be used for the
Supreme Court decision in the text. The major opinions in the litigation to date
will be referred to as the following: Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter ATA I]; Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter ATA II]; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) [hereinafter ATA III]; Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir.
2002) [hereinafter ATA IV].
3. Heather Ross, Clean Air-Is the Sky the Limit?, 143 RESOURCES 13, 15 (Fall
2001).
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When we look at the overall regulatory system, it seems
clear that standard setting has absorbed far too much of our
attention. In the context of the whole regulatory system,
whether or not the EPA's discretion should be limited with
more detailed legislation or through cost-benefit analysis is not
a major problem. Contrary to the assumption of many critics,
the regulatory system is not oblivious to cost. Costs and bene-
fits collide in the implementation process, ultimately leading to
a rough balance. Nor is the EPA an unrestrained "loose can-
non." Rather than being a leviathan-a Commissariat of Pollu-
tion Control imposing its caprices on the American economy-
the EPA more generally operates as an aggressive negotiator,
needing cooperation from other players in order to accomplish
its goals. The regulatory system's most serious problems are
not at the standard setting stage. Rather, the problem is that
so much policy is made after the standards are set in a setting
where coherence, accountability, and transparency may be diffi-
cult to obtain.
Part II of the article reviews current debates about regula-
tory reform by focusing on two proposals for reforming environ-
mental law: (a) using cost-benefit analysis to set environmental
standards, and (b) using the nondelegation doctrine to cut back
on EPA's discretion. Part III then reviews American Trucking's
complex background. We cannot evaluate the Court's ruling
without understanding how air quality standards and other en-
vironmental requirements are actually implemented. Not only
does cost play an important role in implementation decisions,
but implementation also creates an opportunity for innovative
regulatory techniques. After exploring these implementation
issues in Part IV, the article reevaluates the cost-benefit and
delegation issues in Part V. Cost-benefit analysis before stan-
dards are issued can be misleading because costs and benefits
shift during implementation. Moreover, discretion in issuing
standards-the focus of advocates of a strong delegation doc-
trine-is far less pervasive than discretion in implementation.
The conclusion is that regulatory reformers should move on to
new issues that are more connected with the realities of the reg-
ulatory system.
Why has the debate been so fixated on standard setting?
One reason is simply that setting standards actually is impor-
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
tant. It sets the stage for, and thereby shapes, the remainder of
the regulatory process. Moreover, standard setting raises nor-
mative questions that reverberate through the process as a
whole, and the issue of how to set standards raises intriguing
theoretical questions of its own. It is probably also not irrele-
vant that standard setting takes place in Washington, where it
attracts the attention of nationally known economists, lawyers,
and judges (not to mention law clerks who are likely to become
academics). Finally, arguing about standards avoids the need
for immersion in the complex process of implementation. Con-
sequently, the initial step, setting the standards, has tended to
receive far more attention than the later steps of implementa-
tion and enforcement. But it is time we turned more of our at-
tention to these later stages, where the regulatory system really
comes to grips with environmental problems.
There is an irony here. Despite the battle between advo-
cates of cost-benefit analysis and defenders of traditional regu-
lation, they share the same static view of the structure of
regulation. In this view, the government gathers all available
data and establishes a mechanism that will, once and for all,
implement the desired standard of environmental quality. Ad-
mittedly, the two sides differ in terms of the criteria for estab-
lishing the standard, one being purely environmental benefits
and the other being the ratio of costs to benefits. They may dis-
agree about how much discretion Congress should be allowed to
give the EPA in setting standards. They may also differ in their
preferences about implementation, since advocates of cost-bene-
fit analysis may be more likely to favor the use of market mech-
anisms. But they both have the same fundamental vision of a
unitary decision maker laying down permanent regulatory poli-
cies. Both implicitly depend on a static, unilateral vision of the
policymaking process.
This fundamental vision of modern environmental law is
distorted. Environmental law does not involve setting stan-
dards once and for all and then blindly forcing compliance.
Rather, it is a dynamic process in which long-term goals are
constantly reevaluated and renegotiated in the course of ongo-
ing interactions between federal and state regulatory agencies,
industry, and political actors. EPA's discretion over standards
probably matters less than its discretion in implementation,
[Vol. 23:43
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which the delegation doctrine does not reach. Cost-benefit anal-
ysis may be a useful source of information at various parts of
this process, particularly when we try to determine the merits
of various implementation techniques. However, trying to base
fundamental policy decisions on this technique would be a
mistake.
In short, meaningful regulatory reform needs to start by
understanding the dynamic regulatory process we actually
have. Continuing to debate how best to run a static regulatory
system is beside the point.
II. TWO DEBATES ABOUT REGULATION
When the Court decided American Trucking, it was far
from writing on a clean slate. Instead, it was adding a coda to a
long battle, one that has consumed many trees. The cost-bene-
fit debate has produced a particularly rich literature, which will
only be sampled here. The delegation issue involves theoretical
disputes about the separation of powers that are largely beyond
the scope of this article. But with respect to both issues, the
reader should at least gain a familiarity with the basic battle
lines of the environmentalists and the regulatory reformers.
A. The Cost-Benefit Dispute
For the past quarter-century, a debate has raged between
environmentalists and advocates of cost-benefit analysis. 4 One
side relies on ethics while the other relies on economics as the
basis for environmental decisions. The opposing views have
been developed in an increasingly sophisticated body of
scholarship.
In rejecting a balancing test between costs and benefits,
some environmental advocates invoke the principle that pollut-
ing is morally wrong.5 They argue that the issue is not how
much polluters should sacrifice financially to save lives, but in-
4. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECo-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35-69, 83-114 (1999), for an evaluation of
the key competing arguments.
5. See David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 171 (1995).
Of course, not all environmentalists are so staunchly opposed to economic
thinking.
5
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stead, how pollution regulation can "prevent[] people from be-
ing killed by the actions of other people."6 Rather than
deploring the economic impact of environmental law, they say
that the government should encourage "a habit of living that is
simple, frugal, and natural-a habit of living that seeks to re-
lease human potentiality by helping individuals to transcend
the daily temptations of shallow and greedy consumerism."7 Ul-
timately, the argument continues, "environmentalism aspires
to achieve development without growth" by releasing "individ-
ual potential" without "continuing the relentless economic ex-
pansion that threatens to overwhelm the carrying capacity of
the planet."8
Critics of this form of environmentalism do not quarrel
with the proposition that environmental quality is desirable.
Instead, they stress that "life necessarily involves tradeoffs."9
To the view that "[h]uman health and safety should come first,"
they respond:
Plainly .. .this is not always so. There are many potential
ways that society could engender greater public safety, such as
requiring a standard weight for new automobiles or shutting
down entire polluting industries, yet we refuse to choose them be-
cause of the cost....
... Current environmental laws permit tons of pollutants to
enter water and air every day, because, as a nation, we do not
6. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARv. L. REV.
1421, 1437 (2000).
7. Id. at 1446.
8. Id.
9. Scott Farrow & Michael Toman, Using Benefit-Cost Analysis to Improve
Envionmental Regulations, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1999, at 12, 35. This article also
provides a useful primer on cost-benefit analysis and its potential utility. How-
ever, not all critics of current regulation embrace cost-benefit analysis. Staking
out a unique position, Richard Epstein argues for treating pollution as an invasion
of property rights, while limiting government protection for endangered species.
See Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half, 109 YALE L.J. 1639 (2000), for a
discussion of this position. For instance, he says that it is "not clear" that the state
"could license the pollution of public waters even if it received compensation." Id.
at 1653. This seems to be a more absolutist position than that taken by Congress
or by some environmentalists. On the other hand, according to Epstein, if the
state wants to preserve habitat for endangered species, it must compensate land-
owners. Id. at 1665-66.
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judge pollution so harshly that we are willing to give up our entire
way of life to eliminate it.10
Critics of environmentalism often advocate the use of cost-
benefit analysis. This technique became part of our regulatory
system over twenty years ago, when President Reagan issued
an order requiring its use by all government agencies except
where otherwise forbidden by law. As modified by later presi-
dents, this mandate remains in place today. Later, expanded
use of cost-benefit analysis was a major plank in the Contract
with America." One proposal for regulatory reform would have
completely replaced public health mandates with cost-benefit
analysis for all new regulations. 12 Such a proposal came very
close to enactment seven years ago. 13
The environmentalist counterattack questions the morality
of cost-benefit analysis. Mark Sagoff, an environmental philos-
opher, has developed this critique in particular detail.' 4 His ba-
sic claim is that cost-benefit analysis applies only to personal
preferences, as expressed in monetary terms, while environ-
mentalism involves true moral values. 15 Such moral issues, he
believes, properly belong to the political process and cannot be
resolved through economic analysis. 16 In a nutshell, Sagoffs
thesis "is that social regulation expresses what we believe, what
we are, what we stand for as a nation, not simply what we wish
to buy as individuals."'17 One of Sagoff's recent essays elo-
quently compares our attitude toward the environment to the
10. Paul Boudreaux, Environmental Costs, Benefits, and Values: A Review of
Daniel A. Farber's Eco-Pragmatism, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 130 (1999) (book
review).
11. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Pub-
lic Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 553, 635 (2001).
12. See Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and
(Breach of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroy-
ing Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 16-17 (1996); Cass Sun-
stein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 269-72 (1996).
13. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory
Intepretation and Longstanding Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Dele-
gation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 17 (2000).
14. See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1988) for a discussion of his position.
15. Id. at 56.
16. Id. at 8-9, 17-18, 26-27, 113.
17. Id. at 16-17.
2002]
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reverence we feel at Gettysburg.'8 He concedes that economic
feasibility does operate as a constraint; 19 nevertheless, the
"principle economists tout, net benefits maximization, is rarely
if ever relevant or appropriate."20 Our global environmental
principle should be the same one that operates at Gettysburg
national park: "Keeping the place the same holy place, that's
what's important."21
In response to such criticisms, some supporters of cost-ben-
efit analysis have moved away from endorsing cost-benefit anal-
ysis as an ultimate moral standard. They advance pragmatic
arguments on its behalf while decoupling it from the normative
framework that Sagoff and others have challenged. 22 For in-
stance, Judge Posner contends that the theoretical objections to
cost-benefit analysis "have crumbled at the practical level" as
the method has become "fashionable... at all levels of govern-
ment."23 Posner argues that cost-benefit analysis can "improve
the quality of governmental decision making," if only by uncov-
ering "bizarre anomalies" in the treatment of risks by different
agencies. 24 Brushing aside moral critiques of cost-benefit analy-
sis, he claims that the technique needs to be founded "on noth-
ing deeper or more rigorous than a showing that it has
consequences that we like."25 Its most important benefit, he
18. Mark Sagoff, At the Monument to General Meade, or On the Difference Be-
tween Beliefs and Benefits, 42 ARiz. L. REV. 433 (2000).
19. Id. at 462.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Robert Moore). Sagoff is not alone in questioning the equa-
tion of environmental values and ordinary economic benefits. Economist Amartya
Sen agrees that the "very idea that I treat the prevention of an environmental
damage just like buying a private good is itself quite absurd." Amartya Sen, The
Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 949 (June 2000). Phi-
losophers such as Martha Nussbaum also criticize cost-benefit analysis for over-
looking the "distinctive nature" of some costs; some costs, she says, are "bad in a
distinctive way. No citizen should have to bear them." Martha C. Nussbaum, The
Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1005, 1036 (2000).
22. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
139 (1996), for an examination of other efforts to defend cost-benefit analysis with-
out embracing a reductionist normative program.
23. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1158 (2000).
24. Id. at 1157.
25. Id. at 1169.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/2
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says, has been to "demonstrate . . . that federal regulation of
hazards to safety and health is a crazy quilt and in particular
that many of the regulations are bad specifically because they
flunk a cost-benefit test."26
Critics of cost-benefit analysis reply with some practical
concerns of their own. They worry that its use may further os-
sify the regulatory process and shift decisionmaking authority
from "front line" agencies such as EPA, to economists in the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) who may lack similar
accountability or scientific expertise.27 Critics of the process
also stress the technical difficulties involved in cost-benefit
analysis. Merely determining regulatory costs can be quite dif-
ficult;28 quantifying the benefits of environmental regulation is
even more controversial. 29 Thus, they argue, cost-benefit analy-
sis may not be quite the panacea its advocates sometimes seem
to suggest.
Partisans of these conflicting viewpoints have warred bit-
terly.30 Advocates of cost-benefit analysis sometimes dismiss
their opponents as little more than religious zealots.31 Environ-
mentalists respond that cost-benefit analysis is a recipe for "pa-
ralysis by analysis."32 They sometimes accuse cost-benefit
analysis of a moral insensitivity akin to calculating a beloved
pet's possible market value as a lab animal or food source. 33
And so the debate continues.
26. Id. at 1170. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000), for a pragmatic argument for cost-benefit analysis
based on cognitive psychology.
27. See generally THOMAS 0. McGASiTy, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 281
(1991).
28. See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, Pre-
dicting the Costs of Environmental Regulations: How Accurate are Regulators' Esti-
mates?, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1999, at 10-14, 40.
29. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE
L.J. 1981 (1998).
30. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Be-
yond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997), for a sum-
mary of viewpoints.
31. See Robert W. Hahn, Toward a New Environmental Paradigm, 102 YALE
L.J. 1719, 1754 (1993), for a criticism of environmentalist "Visionaries" as "almost
of necessity religious in nature" and likely to "demonstrate little tolerance for op-
posing views."
32. Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory
Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 626 (1996).
33. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 193 (1993).
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B. The Delegation Dispute
A less publicized but almost equally fervent debate has in-
volved the powers of administrative agencies. Critics argue
that Congress has ducked its own responsibilities by giving the
hard policy choices to agencies like EPA. The breadth of agency
discretion raises concerns about political accountability for criti-
cal decisions of national policy. In constitutional terms, at least
in a sufficiently extreme case, this transfer of authority could
violate the delegation doctrine, which holds that Congress alone
must exercise true legislative power.34
The basic legal principles are clear. On the one hand "it is a
breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its
legislative power and transfers it to the President.. . ."3 On the
other hand, "Congress has found it frequently necessary to use
officers of the Executive branch... by vesting discretion in such
officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and
directing the details of its execution."36 Hence, the Supreme
Court has ruled, delegation is lawful if Congress establishes an
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency.37
Although the Supreme Court has used this doctrine to
strike down federal statutes only twice-both times in the same
year 38-individual Justices have invoked it on more recent occa-
sions. 39 Chief Justice Rehnquist in particular has complained
that health and safety laws give the agency complete discretion
about tradeoffs between human lives and costs. 40 The question
is whether the doctrine should be revitalized as a realistic check
on administrative agencies.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
35. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 409.
38. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
39. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(Benzene Case) (plurality opinion invoking delegation doctrine to justify narrow
interpretation of statutory grant of authority).
40. See id. at 675. More recently, Justice Thomas has argued that the intelli-
gible interest test is too weak: "I believe that there are cases in which the principle
is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great
for the decision to be called anything other than 'legislative'." ATA III, 531 U.S.
457, 487 (2001).
[Vol. 23:43
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/2
2002] RETHINKING REGULATORY REFORM 53
Regulatory reformers argue that a revitalized nondelega-
tion doctrine would serve several purposes. First, they main-
tain, it would improve accountability and deliberation.
Democracy, in its most basic sense, requires decisionmaking by
the people and their delegates; fundamental policy should not
be set by unaccountable technocrats. 41 Government, in short, is
supposed to derive from "We the People," not "They the
Bureaucrats."
Second, anti-delegationists argue that restraining delega-
tion would protect liberty by requiring multiple organs of gov-
ernment to agree on major new policies. As Sunstein says,
"[t]he vesting of lawmaking power in Congress is designed to
ensure the combination of deliberation and accountability that
comes from saying that government power cannot be brought to
bear on individuals unless diverse representatives, from diverse
places, have managed to agree on the details."42 As episodes of
executive tyranny in other legal systems show, unlimited dele-
gation can make possible "lawmaking exercises that would oth-
erwise have been extremely cumbersome, and hence remove[]
an important check on arbitrary rule."43
Finally, anti-delegationists argue that the restrictions on
delegation restrain arbitrary agency actions by providing a stat-
utory benchmark against which they can be tested in court.
This argument invokes our vision of the rule of law as opposed
to "the exercise of discretion or preference by those persons who
happen to be in positions of authority. '44
Critics of the delegation doctrine have their own argu-
ments. Jerry Mashaw argues that delegation actually improves
accountability because agencies must answer to the President,
the only nationally elected official. 45 Moreover, in some ways
41. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 101 (1993).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 336 (1999).
43. Id.
44. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1424 (2000) (quoting
JERRY L MAsHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IM-
PROVE PUBLIC LAW 138-39 (1997)).
45. See JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 145-57 (1997).
11
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agency proceedings are more open to effective public participa-
tion than are legislative proceedings. 46 Critics of the doctrine
stress both the practical need to give agencies substantial dis-
cretion, especially in highly technical areas, as well as the im-
possibility of defining how much delegation is too much. For
instance, Justice Scalia has long argued that delegation is cen-
tral to our current system of government and that no clear stan-
dard exists to govern the degree of delegation.47 The factors
involved, according to Scalia, are "both multifarious and (in the
nonpartisan sense) highly political," and the Court has "almost
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the per-
missible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those exe-
cuting or applying the law."48
The Clean Air Act has provided fertile ground for critics
who seek tighter delegations and more use of cost-benefit analy-
sis. According to one critic of EPA, if air pollution regulation is
"not the standardless exercise of legislative power-or 'delega-
tion running riot"' then "it is difficult to imagine what could
be."49 As we will see in Part III, this argument had some suc-
cess in the D.C. Circuit.
III. THE BATTLE OVER REVISED AIR.
QUALITY STANDARDS
The Supreme Court's opinion in American Trucking does
not dwell on the context of the case. Nevertheless, without un-
derstanding that context, it is difficult to assess the significance
of the opinion. We begin with the regulatory scheme and the
promulgation of the particular regulations involved in the case,
and then trace the resulting litigation in the D.C. Circuit
through the Supreme Court.
46. See Peter H. Shuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-82 (1999).
47. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. at 416.
49. C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 235, 247-48 (1998).
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A. The Regulatory Scheme
The Clean Air Act is an incredibly long and complex stat-
ute.50 However, the core of the statute is relatively simple.
Under section 108, EPA is required to prepare a list of pollu-
tants emitted by multiple sources that have adverse health or
environmental effects. 51 Once a substance is on the list, the
next step is to issue national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) under section 109. There are two types of standards:
primary standards that are "requisite to protect public health"
and secondary standards that protect the "public welfare"
(which includes various forms of environmental effects). 52 In
setting these standards, EPA is specifically required to explain
any deviation from the recommendations of an independent ad-
visory agency.53
The statute originally set an ambitious timetable for
achieving these air quality standards. Front-line authority for
achieving the standards rests with the states. Section 110 origi-
nally required every state to submit an implementation plan
50. See WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STAT-
UTES: 2000-2001 EDUCATIONAL EDITION 738-1026 (2000), for a recent reprint of the
statute that occupies almost 300 double-columned pages. The evolution of the
statute is reviewed in Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air
Pollution Control, 36 Hous. L. REV. 679 (1999).
51. See Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000). Section 108(a)(1) in-
structs the Administrator to list "each air pollutant":
(A) emissions of which, in his judgment... may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or di-
verse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before December 31,
1970, but for which he plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.
EPA argued that the language of clause (C) ("for which he plans to issue") rendered
listing discretionary, but the law is now clear that listing is mandatory once EPA
determines the criteria are present. See NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1976) (requiring EPA to list lead as a criteria pollutant).
52. EPA is to prescribe primary standards "the attainment and maintenance
of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria [under § 108]
and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public
health." Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). The secondary
standards are supposed to be "requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollu-
tant in the ambient air." Clean Air Act § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2000).
53. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 321. The use of independent scientific
evaluations has become increasingly important in environmental regulation. See
Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606 (2000).
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within nine months.5 4 EPA was required to approve the plan if
it promised to attain the primary standards within three years
of approval. 55 EPA is not allowed to consider economic or tech-
nological feasibility when reviewing state implementation plans
(usually called SIPs), although states may choose to take cost
into account when designing their SIPs.56 If the state fails to
submit an acceptable plan, EPA issues a plan of its own for that
state.57
The initial deadline for achieving the air quality standards
turned out to be utterly unrealistic. Congress responded by ex-
tending the schedule for compliance. Section 172, as amended
in 1977, effectively postponed compliance with the primary
standards until 1982, or 1987 for oxidants and carbon monox-
ide.58 But even the revised deadlines turned out to be too ambi-
tious. In 1990, the statute was once again amended, providing
a complex new set of rules designed to promote attainment.
Briefly, the 1990 amendments require states to modify their
SIPs to achieve compliance by a new deadline and to impose
detailed interim requirements on nonattainment areas.5 9
States failing to submit such SIP amendments face possible
funding cutoffs and may have an EPA implementation plan im-
posed on them. Increasingly stringent requirements are placed
on new sources in non-attainment areas. 60
The 1990 amendments also contain specific provisions re-
lating to particular pollutants such as ozone.61 The statute di-
vides ozone non-attainment areas into five classes. 62 Only Los
Angeles is in the worst class ("extreme" nonattainment). 63
54. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 63-67 (1975) (describing the statutory
scheme).
55. See Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000). The statute
also contains special provisions dealing with pollution control for new cars and
newly constructed industrial facilities, which are not relevant here.
56. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976).
57. Id. at 246.
58. See ROGER FINDLEY & DANIEL FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 364-65 (5th
ed. 1999).
59. See id. at 366.
60. See id. For a more detailed description, see Luneberg, supra note 2, at 10-
18.
61. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 58, at 366.
62. See id.
63. See id.
[Vol. 23:43
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/2
2002] RETHINKING REGULATORY REFORM 57
Deadlines for compliance are keyed to this scheme. For exam-
ple, "marginal" areas must comply within three years, while at
the other extreme a city like Los Angeles is given twenty
years.64 As usual in environmental law, complexity abounds.
Additional requirements relate to percentage reductions in
emissions of volatile organic compounds, permitting rules for
major sources, and restrictions on new construction. 65
Interstate transport of nitrogen oxide complicates ozone
control by creating atmospheric ozone. Nitrogen oxides can be
transported hundreds of miles into the Northeast, with the re-
sult that some states would not be in compliance with the stan-
dards even if they had no emissions of their own.66 The 1990
amendments established a commission of the states in the
transport area to advise EPA on pollution control methods. 67
The commission voted to recommend that EPA impose ex-
tremely strict standards on car emissions throughout the re-
gion. Although EPA's effort to follow this recommendation was
blocked by litigation, negotiations between EPA, the states, and
the auto industry resulted in a stringent voluntary program.68
While these arduous attempts to comply with the existing ozone
standards were underway, the process of reevaluating those
standards had already begun.
B. Rulemaking Issues
The revised NAAQS for ozone and particulates were issued
in 1997. Prior rulemakings had established that NAAQS are to
be based on three factors: the seriousness of adverse health ef-
fects, whether effects are temporary or permanent, and the
number of people sensitive to the effects.6 9 Because the techni-
cal issues were somewhat different, it is worth considering the
standards for the two substances separately. 70
64. See id.
65. See generally id. at 365-67.
66. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 58, at 281.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New"
Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
70. For sharp criticism of EPA's evaluation of the evidence, see Gray, supra
note 49, at 239-45.
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1. The Ozone Standard
Ozone is not directly emitted by pollution sources. Instead,
it is formed from other air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides
and hydrocarbons in the presence of sunshine.71 The new rule
changed the ozone standard from .12 ppm to .08 ppm; it also
changed the averaging period from one hour to eight hours. The
two changes were to some extent offsetting; the new standards
allowed short bursts of higher concentrations while the .08 level
was actually a return to an earlier level that had been in effect
about twenty years ago.72 To determine the health risk to the
public from ozone, the agency estimated exposures for children
and workers whose activities were outdoors.7 3
Assuming that a significant risk existed at the currently al-
lowed .12 ppm level, the question was how far to lower the ceil-
ing. EPA concluded that a level above .08 ppm would not
protect sensitive populations adequately.7 4 EPA also rejected
arguments for a lower standard of .07 ppm because the most
certain effects at the .08 level are "transient and reversible,"
and the existence of serious effects is much less certain at lower
levels. 75 The agency also observed that a .07 ppm standard
would be close to natural background levels in some locations,
and no members of its scientific advisory group had supported a
level below .08 ppm. 76 As interpreted by a sympathetic ob-
server, the agency's somewhat cryptic remarks indicated that
EPA was "balancing the severity of the potential effect against
the degree of certainty with which it could predict that effect
would in fact result."77 This lead the EPA to conclude that it
could not confidently identify a .07 level with significant ad-
verse effects, while it would be "much more confident" that
levels above .08 ppm presented serious risks.78
71. George D. Thurston, Scientific Research for Ozone and Fine Particulate
Standards, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 35 (1998).
72. See McGarity, supra note 13, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6-7.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 7. No background levels close to .08 had been observed. See id. at
15.
77. McGarity, supra note 13, at 11.
78. Id. at 11.
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EPA's background document on ozone's health effects is
said to be the size of "three Manhattan phone books." 79 In issu-
ing the revised standard, the agency cited almost two hundred
health studies that suggested the existence of health effects in
children and other sensitive groups at the prior level.80 For in-
stance, EPA found decreased lung function in tests of children
exposed to .12 ppm and found that hospital admissions in-
creased on days with high ozone levels.8' The agency also deter-
mined that ozone posed a particular risk to asthmatics because
it not only inflamed airways and increased sensitivity to aller-
gens, but also reduced the effectiveness of the most common
steroid medications.8 2 All told, studies showed a thirteen per-
cent increase in respiratory patients per 100 ppb increase in
ozone levels.8 3 Interestingly, the studies found that some ap-
parently normal individuals are highly sensitive to ozone, while
others are tolerant of much greater exposures.8 4
The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) accompanying the
ozone standards was mixed. Taking into account that full at-
tainment of the standards might be difficult, it found that even
partial attainment of the standards might prevent between zero
and eighty deaths annually, over one hundred emergency room
admissions for asthma, and a substantial number of illnesses.8 5
As a result, even partial attainment of the standards could
bring a total monetized benefit of $400 million to $2.1 billion at
a cost of roughly $1.1 billion.8 6 The benefits estimate did not
include all positive effects, such as general improvement in lung
function.8 7 On the other hand, the RIA did not take into ac-
count much higher estimates of cost produced by the American
79. John Vandenberg, Colloquium: Scientific Research for Ozone and Fine
Particulate Matter, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 55 (1998).
80. Id. at 56.
81. Thurston, supra note 71, at 39.
82. Id. at 39-40
83. Id. at 40.
84. Vandenberg, supra note 79, at 57.
85. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 328.
86. Id. at 328-29.
87. See Ronald Evans, Economic Impact Analysis: The EPA Perspective, 16
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 67 (1998).
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Petroleum Institute and others.88 It also ignored possible posi-
tive effects of low-level ozone in blocking ultraviolet radiation.8 9
2. Particulates
EPA has regulated particulates since 1971, but has
changed both the level of regulation and the definition since
then. In 1987, EPA concluded that particulate matter (PM)
with diameters below 10 micrometers were small enough to
enter the lungs, and it set an annual standard of 50 micrograms
per cubic meter of air.90 After EPA was successfully sued by the
American Lung Association, it embarked on a reappraisal of the
standard.91 The agency then distinguished between fine PM
(under 2.5 micrometers) and coarse PM, setting a standard of
15 micrograms per cubic meter. The old PM standard was mod-
ified only slightly to apply to coarse PM.92
According to EPA, more than sixty epidemiological studies
showed significant connections between serious illness and PM
levels at or below the currently permitted level.93 In one partic-
ularly striking study, asthma and pneumonia admissions
dropped sharply when a steel mill in Utah closed and PM levels
declined, but then levels increased when the plant reopened and
PM levels rose.94 The record showed a range of adverse health
effects at the current levels, including risks of hundreds of pre-
mature deaths a year, many more hospital admissions, and tens
of thousands of breathing problems in children.95 But some ob-
servers contested these conclusions by arguing that some of the
correlations were spurious; for instance, both particulate levels
and hospital admissions may vary for independent reasons on
88. See Alan Krupnick, Economic Analysis, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 74-75
(1998).
89. See ATA I, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
90. See Lucinda Minton Langworthy, EPA's New Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter and Ozone: Boon for Health or Threat to the Clean Air Act?, 28
ENVTL. L. REP. 10502, 10503 (1998).
91. See Am. Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994).
92. Langworthy, supra note 90, at 10503.
93. See Vandenberg, supra note 79, at 58.
94. See Thurston, supra note 71, at 44.
95. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 326.
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different days of the week. 96 Studies of the impact of fine PM
were particularly difficult. Because there was no regulatory
standard in effect for these particulates, monitoring was not re-
quired, so information about current exposure levels was
spotty.97
Particulate reductions accounted for the bulk of the bene-
fits reported in the RIA for the new standards.98 The RIA re-
ported that the new particulate regulations would prevent 350
annual deaths, almost seven thousand cases of chronic bronchi-
tis, and a considerable number of lost workdays and reduced
activity days. Using a "partial attainment" scenario, the RIA
estimated the benefits at $19 billion to $104 billion, with an es-
timated cost of $8.6 billion.99 Indeed, the RIA suggested that
even tighter standards would produce additional health bene-
fits of four billion dollars, which could translate into as many as
two hundred additional saved lives. 100 However, EPA concluded
that studies showing ill effects at even lower levels were statis-
tically unreliable. 10 1
C. The Delegation Question
The final rules were issued in July of 1997, and were
promptly challenged in court. Arguments were held on Decem-
ber 17, 1998, before a panel of the D.C. Circuit consisting of
Judges Williams, Ginsburg, and Tatel. On May 14, 1999-two
years after the standards had been issued-the court issued an
opinion that stunned many legal observers. 10 2 The court held
that the EPA's interpretation of the statute would render it an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 0 3
Reviewing EPA's explanation for its choice of standards,
the court could find little rationale beyond the truism that "ef-
fects are less certain and less severe at lower levels of expo-
96. See Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American Trucking Part I: Can EPA Re-
vive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10660 (1999) (referred to
as Oren, Part I).
97. See id.
98. See Krupnick, supra note 88, at 76.
99. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 329.
100. Id. at 329-30.
101. See ATA 1, 175 F.3d 1027, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1027.
103. Id. at 1033.
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sure."10 4 The same reasoning, according to the court, could
justify any pollution level whatsoever:
The principle EPA invokes . . . could as easily, for any non-
threshold pollutant, justify a standard of zero. The same indeter-
minacy prevails in EPA's decisions not to pick a still more
stringent level. For example, EPA's reasons for not lowering the
ozone standard from 0.08 to 0.07 ppm-that "the more serious ef-
fects . . . are less certain" at the lower levels and that the lower
levels are "closer to peak background levels," could also be em-
ployed to justify a refusal to reduce levels below those associated
with London's "Killer Fog" of 1952 .... Thus, the agency rightly
recognizes that the question is one of degree, but offers no intelli-
gible principle by which to identify a stopping point.'
05
As to "[what sorts of 'intelligible principles' might EPA adopt,"
the court admitted that circuit precedent precluded cost-benefit
analysis. 0 6 "Nonetheless," the court said, "an agency wielding
the power over American life possessed by EPA should be capa-
ble of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm
that takes into account population affected, severity and
probability," 0 7 perhaps following the lines of a scheme devised
by Oregon to allocate funds among various medical treatments
for the poor.
Besides this blockbuster ruling that the Clean Air Act was
unconstitutional (at least under EPA's interpretation), the court
dealt with a number of subsidiary matters. It reaffirmed the
irrelevance of cost to setting NAAQS. 08 The court also ruled
that the new ozone standard could not be implemented until
Congress mandated a timetable for implementing the old stan-
dard. 10 9 The court also held that EPA must consider the poten-
tially beneficial effects of ozone in blocking ultraviolet rays"0
and that the standard for coarse particulates was invalid be-
cause it also included fine particulates."'
104. Id. at 1035.
105. Id. at 1036-37 (citations omitted).
106. ATA I, 175 F.3d at 1038.
107. Id. at 1039.
108. Id. at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
109. Id. at 1045-51. General nonattainment rules can be found in subpart 1 of
Part D of the Clean Air Act, but the court concluded that subpart 2, specifically
addressing ozone attainment, was controlling. Id.
110. ATA I, 175 F.3d at 1050-52.
111. Id. at 1052-55.
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Judge Tatel wrote a spirited dissent, accusing the majority
of ignoring "the last half-century of Supreme Court nondelega-
tion jurisprudence .... "112 He emphasized that the agency's
line drawing was based on findings that risks were either less
certain or transient and reversible below certain levels. 1 3 In
sum, he concluded that the EPA "set the ozone level just above
peak background concentrations where the most certain health
effects are not transient and reversible," and the EPA set the
fine particulate level at "the lowest long-term mean concentra-
tion observed in studies that showed a statistically significant
relationship between fine particle pollution and adverse health
effects."114
Administrator Carol Browner publicly denounced the ma-
jority opinion as "extreme, illogical and bizarre." 115 Over 250
public interest groups immediately urged the Justice Depart-
ment to appeal. 1 6 Even the lawyer who represented small busi-
nesses in the challenge to the air standards admitted that the
ruling was completely unexpected: "This time last year, there
were three people in Washington who believed in nondelegation
in this area," he said." 7
Not surprisingly, the government sought rehearing by the
panel and rehearing en banc. Although the petitions failed," 8
the dissents were significant in two respects. First, in his dis-
sent from rehearing by the panel, Judge Tatel parted company
with the majority over the ozone implementation issue, arguing
that EPA should be able to impose the new standard for areas
that had already met the old one." 9 Second, Judge Silberman,
a conservative stalwart, dissented from the denial of a rehear-
ing en banc, calling the panel's reliance on the nondelegation
doctrine "ingenious" but "fundamentally unsound." 20 Dissent-
ing on the en banc issue, Judge Tatel said again that the panel
112. Id. at 1057.
113. Id. at 1058-60.
114. Id. at 1061.
115. Steve France, EPA, Lawyers, Scholars Take Measure of 'Nondelegation'
Theory in Ozone Ruling, 67 U.S.L.W. 2739 (1999).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ATA II, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 11-12.
120. Id. at 14.
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not only departed from a half-century of controlling precedent
"but in doing so, it stripped the Environmental Protection
Agency of much of its ability to implement the Clean Air Act,
this nation's primary means of protecting the safety of the air
breathed by hundreds of millions of people."121
D. The Relevance of Cost
The D.C. Circuit's use of the nondelegation doctrine was
widely criticized by commentators. 122 Some commentators sug-
gested that the Supreme Court use the opportunity to require
use of cost-benefit analysis in setting NAAQS. 123 However, the
Supreme Court sided with EPA on both of these issues. 124 Sur-
prisingly, not only was the result unanimous, but the opinion
was written by Justice Scalia, the most anti-environmentalist of
the Justices. 125 Justice Scalia's opinion is brisk and to the
point.
First, Scalia rejected the arguments for considering cost.
Because the text of the statute mentions only public health in
setting NAAQS, Justice Scalia stated that the exclusion of cost
might have been thought fairly clear "[w]ere it not for the hun-
dreds of pages of briefing" submitted on the issue.126 Inasmuch
as the statute does allow for consideration of costs in many
121. Id. at 17.
122. See Robert W. Adler, American Trucking and the Revival(?) of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10233 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, The
Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 121 (2001); Mc-
Garity, supra note 13; Oren, supra note 96; Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 69;
Sunstein, supra note 42; Deborah Behles, Comment, A Wrong Turn Crushes Pro-
tective Air Regulations: American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 85 MiNN. L. REV. 319
(2000). See Bressman, supra note 44 for the best defense of Judge Williams'
opinion.
123. See C. Boyden Gray, The Search for an Intelligible Principle: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 47 (2000). See
also Sunstein, supra note 42, at 377-78 (suggesting that "it is not entirely clear
that the statute should be construed to forbid cost-benefit analysis" and that, if the
Supreme Court failed to reject the lower courts' preclusion of cost-benefit analysis,
a statutory amendment might be in order).
124. See ATA III, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)
125. See Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in
the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1999) (assigning Scalia an envi-
ronmental score "so low that one can fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives envi-
ronmental protection concerns as promoting a set of legal rules antithetical to that
which he favors").
126. ATA III, 531 U.S. at 465.
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other contexts, Justice Scalia said that the Court had previously
refused to find implicit authorization in ambiguous sections of
the Act. Hence, the challengers were required to show "a tex-
tual commitment of authority" to EPA to consider costs and
"that textual commitment must be a clear one."'127 No such
clear textual commitment could be found. True, industry cited
minor references to cost in peripheral provisions relating to the
standards, but such nuances should not be allowed to set the
overall interpretation of the statute: "Congress, we have held,
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in
vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say,
hide elephants in mouseholes." 128
On somewhat different grounds, Justice Breyer agreed in
his concurrence that cost was irrelevant. All things being
equal, according to Breyer, "we should read silences or ambigui-
ties in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not
forbidding, this type of rational regulation."129 But he found the
legislative history preclusive, for it showed that Congress in-
tended to impose standards beyond current economic or techno-
logical feasibility in order to force technology improvements and
to preserve public health. 130 Nevertheless, he argued, the statu-
tory language allowed EPA to ignore trivial risks and to avoid
"deindustrialization."131 Since preindustrial society was not a
very healthy society, a standard that necessitated the return of
the Stone Age would not be "requisite to protect the public
health."132
Justice Scalia also flatly rejected the D.C. Circuit's novel
version of nondelegation doctrine. Simply speaking, the Clean
Air Act provided a sufficient intelligible principle: "Section
109(b)(1) of the CAA [Clean Air Act], which to repeat we inter-
pret as requiring the EPA to set air quality standards at the
level that is 'requisite'-that is, not lower or higher than is nec-
essary-to protect the public health with an adequate margin of
safety, fits comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted
127. Id. at 468.
128. Id. at 468.
129. Id.at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 492-96.
131. ATA III, 531 U.S. at 494.
132. Id.
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by our precedent."133 Scalia scoffed at the lower court's view
that EPA could cure a nondelegation problem by adopting ad-
ministrative standards. "The very choice of which portion of the
[statutory] power to exercise," he said, "would itself be an exer-
cise of the forbidden legislative authority."'134
EPA did not fare as well, however, on the issue of ozone
implementation. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court
did not find the relationship between subpart 1 (ordinary nonat-
tainment rules) and subpart 2 (special ozone nonattainment
rules) to be unambiguous. 135 But EPA's interpretation-that it
could ignore subpart 2 and simply implement the new ozone
standards under subpart 1-was unreasonable because it would
have allowed the elaborate restrictions and timetable of subpart
2 to be nullified the day after the statute was passed.136 The
Court left to EPA, after remand, the task of developing a rea-
sonable interpretation of the nonattainment implementation
provisions. 137
In short, the Court's decision was primarily important for
what it did not do: it did not change the well-established view of
the lower courts that consideration of cost is precluded, and it
did not agree with the D.C. Circuit's novel constitutional argu-
ment. The upshot is to close the door to cost-benefit analysis in
setting air quality standards. However, it is obvious that final-
izing and implementing the standards will be a long process.
The Court's decision came down on February 27, 2001, three
and a half years after the regulations were issued. Another
year later, the D.C. Circuit held that the standards were not
arbitrary or capricious, finally opening the door to implementa-
tion. 138 Other issues still remain to be settled. 39
133. Id. at 475-76.
134. Id. at 473. Professor Bressman argues that this part of Justice Scalia's
discussion was dictum, since the Court found that Congress had provided a suffi-
ciently clear standard for regulators. See Bressman, supra note 2, at 473.
135. For a careful analysis of the D.C. Circuit's handling of the issue, see
Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American Trucking Part II: Can EPA Implement Re-
vised Air Quality Standards?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034 (2000) (Oren, Part II). The
Supreme Court's ruling on the issue is analyzed in Luneburg, supra note 2, at 51-
55.
136. See ATA III, 531 U.S. at 483-86.
137. Id. at 486.
138. See ATA IV, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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IV. IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
To evaluate the arguments for regulatory reform, we need
to understand how environmental standards are actually imple-
mented. Much of the debate over regulatory reform seems to
assume that environmental standards are seamlessly trans-
lated into pollution reductions. As it turns out, the road to com-
pliance is considerably longer and more problematic, providing
many opportunities for readjustments and compromise.
A. The Tangled Path to Environmental Compliance
Environmental mandates have a familiar life cycle. A new
statute or amendment is passed with much fanfare. The stat-
ute directs EPA to issue new rules before some deadline, usu-
ally less than a year away. The time comes and goes, but no
EPA action is forthcoming. Sometimes EPA is unable to comply
because of insufficient information or budget shortfalls; some-
times EPA simply chooses not to comply for political reasons or
because it believes the mandate is unworkable. This phenome-
non is a ubiquitous feature of environmental law: deadlines are
missed, standards are ignored or fudged, and enforcement mis-
fires. 140 Thus, as Richard Stewart explains, environmental law
has an "official track" of formal statutory compliance and a
"'shadow' track of decisionmaking that involves varying ele-
ments of more informal procedures and higher-level adminis-
trative review of negotiations between regulators, the
regulated, and (in some cases), third parties."1 4 '
The Clean Water Act provides some striking examples.
Under section 304(b) of the Act,142 the EPA was required to is-
139. EPA has begun to revamp its plans for implementing the ozone standard.
See EPA Begins Rewrite of Ozone Policy to Meet High Court Test, INSIDE EPA
WEEKLY REPORT, March 16, 2001, at 1.
140. These compliance problems are by no means hidden and are probably
well known to anyone with even a small familiarity with the field. Even twenty
years ago, it was clear that regulatory standards were often merely targets rather
than strict mandates. See James A. Henderson & Richard N. Pearson, Implement-
ing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1979). But to a surprising extent, we have managed to focus
our attention elsewhere, thereby sustaining a state of denial regarding the extent
of the compliance shortfall.
141. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U.L. REV. 21, 38 (2001).
142. Clean Water Act § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2000).
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sue effluent guidelines in 1973. These guidelines were sup-
posed to form the basis for effluent limitations under section
301, which in turn had compliance deadlines as early as 1977
and a 1983 deadline for stricter standards. 143 But EPA fell far
behind schedule. For example, it did not issue regulations for
the chemical industry until 1987.'4 Regulations for certain
mining operations were issued in 1988 and upheld two years
later.145 Thus, these particular standards were at least fifteen
years overdue. As a result of such delays, many permits were
issued in the meantime without the benefit of EPA regulations.
Under the statute, until the regulations are in place for an in-
dustry, permits are supposed to be issued under "such condi-
tions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act."146 In practice, states imposed ad
hoc pollution requirements largely unrelated to the apparent
demands of the statute. 147
As the role of state implementation plans under the Clean
Air Act illustrates, environmental statutes often call for states
to assume enforcement authority, subject to federal supervision.
In theory, state programs must meet strict standards. In real-
ity, federal supervision is often lax, and states often can openly
143. See Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). EPA actually
merged the § 304 guidelines with § 301 effluent limitations, which could be consid-
ered a kind of slippage as well.
144. See David G. Gray, Note, "Then the Dogs Died": The Fourth Amendment
and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 617
n.320 (1994).
145. See Rybachek v. Alaska Miners Ass'n, 904 F.2d 1276, 1299-1301 (9th Cir.
1990).
146. Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2000).
147. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1672 (1991).
Congress wanted technology-based standards to apply uniformly to sim-
ilar sources across the nation, but the permits were negotiated on an indi-
vidualized basis incorporating whichever control measures and compliance
schedules dischargers would accept. EPA characterized these permits as
grounded on "best professional judgment;" but they often reflected simply
the "best deal" the Agency could obtain in light of manpower and time con-
straints and its desire to demonstrate progress. These "best professional
judgments" were usually made by EPA regional personnel with water qual-
ity, not technology based, orientations. Thus, many control measures im-
posed in the permits bore little resemblance to the technology-based
requirements mandated by the statute.
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deviate from statutory requirements. The "threat of the EPA
withdrawing approval for any state enforcement programs and
having the federal government assume primary responsibility"
is "hollow due to a lack of federal resources and an expanding
number of regulated entities. '148 Under the Clean Water Act,
states have also managed to dodge or even disobey federal man-
dates outright. As the General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
ported, one state refused to apply new federal standards simply
because it found them to be too strict, but "EPA did not with-
draw the program because it was 'an unrealistic option."' 1 49
States are notoriously uneven in their implementation of the
statute. For instance, sources in one state were allowed to re-
main out of compliance for about fifty percent longer than those
in another state. 150 Indeed, EPA lacks the data it would need to
effectively monitor state programs even if it had the desire to do
So.15 However, the desire itself is often lacking. For instance,
EPA colluded with the states for many years to avoid imple-
menting the "total maximum daily load" requirements of the
Clean Water Act. Only after a series of successful citizen suits
by environmentalists did federal and state agencies belatedly
undertake compliance efforts. 52
The Clinton Administration championed a creative effort to
"reinvent" environmental implementation. 15 3 To soften the ef-
fects of environmental regulations on firms, the Administration
supported measures such as wetlands mitigation and
brownfields regulations. 54 The best-known example is Project
XL, in which the EPA negotiated with selected firms for im-
148. Victor Flatt, A Dirty River, Runs Through It: The Failure of Enforcement
of the Clean Water Act, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (1997).
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id. at 26-27. See also Nicholas C. Yost, The State of Environmental Law
Enforcement: A Speech Presented at the American Bar Association's 1998 Annual
Meeting, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10711, 10712 (1998) (on uneven state enforcement).
151. Flatt, supra note 148, at 18-19.
152. See Oliver Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water
Act's Ambient Standards Program, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10415, 10416 (1998).
153. For a description of these efforts (and their debatable validity under cur-
rent law), see Bradford Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL
and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization,
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998). A particularly useful set of case studies can be found in
Carol Weissner, Regulatory Innovation: Lessons Learned from EPA's Project XL
and Three Minnesota Project XL Pilots, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10075 (2002).
154. Stewart, supra note 141, at 69-71, 76-77.
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proved environmental performance. For instance, to promote
regulatory flexibility, EPA promoted the use of "risk bubbles"
that allow a facility to increase some discharges beyond the
mandated levels in return for larger voluntary reductions in
emissions posing higher risks.155 According to advocates, Project
XL had the potential to make "truly revolutionary changes," al-
lowing use of multi-media performance standards and market-
based controls to improve environmental quality and stream-
line regulation. 156 However, critics alleged that the idea was
simply to excuse some supposedly less significant regulatory vi-
olations in exchange for agreements to transcend the standards
in more important respects. 157
B. Implementing the Clean Air Act
The same complex process of implementation is found
under the 1970 Clean Air Act. Indeed, as it turns out, the
NAAQS that were reviewed in American Trucking epitomize
the critical role of the implementation process. Without under-
standing the true function of air quality standards in the regu-
latory system, we cannot sensibly evaluate the process for
issuing the standards.
1. The Difficulties of Clean Air Compliance
As discussed in Part III, the nation was supposed to have
achieved the primary national air quality standards by 1975.
Two years after the deadline had been missed, Congress
amended the statute and extended the deadline to 1982 (or
1987 for some pollutants). When these deadlines arrived, EPA
was placed in an embarrassing position. For instance, over sev-
enty cities missed the 1987 deadline for ozone and carbon mon-
oxide. EPA managed to put off any serious sanctions until
Congress passed the 1990 amendments, again postponing the
155. Id. at 65.
156. Beth S. Ginsberg & Cynthia Cummis, EPA's Project XL: A Paradigm for
Promising Regulatory Reform, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10059, 10062 (1996). For a re-
view of efforts to conceptualize these innovative approaches, see Daniel A. Farber,
Triangulating the Future of Regulation: Three Emerging Models of Environmental
Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 (2000).
157. See Rena Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Em-
peror Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10527 (1996).
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compliance dates. 158 After 1990, a new cycle of mandates, delay,
and partial compliance began.
These delays and misfires are not due solely to resistance
from industry and other anti-regulation forces. For instance, as
Stewart explains: "[E]nvironmental groups could have success-
fully challenged EPA's practice during the late 1980s of approv-
ing [unrealistic] state implementation plans . . . but these
groups declined to do so because more stringent and realistic
SIP provisions would have required sharp limitations on auto-
mobile use." 159 Early in the 1980s, according to Stewart, when
many states had missed their attainment deadlines,
"[diemocrats in Congress, generally supportive of strong envi-
ronmental regulation, pressured EPA not to bring enforcement
actions, fearing a political backlash that could lead to amend-
ments that would weaken the Act." 160
Just as it has had trouble obtaining state cooperation under
the Clean Water Act,' 6 ' EPA has admitted its unwillingness to
impose strict deadlines or sanctions on state agencies regulat-
ing air pollution.1 62 The full exercise of federal authority in this
area is often impractical because a "successful federal air pollu-
tion control program requires the willing participation of state
administrative agencies." 63  Thus, "Congress and EPA can
quell minor revolts among state agencies, but widespread dis-
satisfaction, manifested in the time-honored 'go-slow' approach,
will bring EPA and even Congress to the bargaining table."164
Consequently, "states have been able to work compromises with
EPA rather than be slavishly subject to federal dictates." 165
But it is not merely recalcitrance by outside forces that in-
terferes with implementation. EPA itself is sometimes the
source of resistance. EPA doggedly refused to implement the
158. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 58.
159. Stewart, supra note 141, at 59.
160. Id. at 59.
161. See sources cited supra notes 148-152.
162. Latin, supra note 147, at 1691.
163. See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1218 (1995). Dwyer's account of the inability of EPA to obtain
state compliance with requirements for "inspection and maintenance" programs is
particularly striking. Id. at 1210-15.
164. Id. at 1224.
165. Id. at 1216.
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original provision of the Clean Air Act regulating toxic pollu-
tants because it considered the provision unworkably draco-
nian. 166 More generally, in the early years of the Act, EPA
regional offices "issued hundreds of administrative orders and
compliance schedules that diverged" from legal requirements
and "were more lenient than necessary to reach attainment."1 67
Until recently, the EPA had been similarly resistant about en-
forcing important provisions of the statute dealing with trans-
boundary pollution. 168
However, it would be a mistake to view the implementation
process too narrowly, as merely an erratic method of forcing
compliance with federal standards. Both EPA and the states
have sometimes used implementation as an opportunity for cre-
ative environmental strategies. For example, EPA adopted an
innovative program of marketable credits when it phased out
leaded gasoline; the program created a net cost savings of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.169 States have also been active in
experimenting with new implementation approaches. For in-
stance, a major experiment in using marketable permits took
place in California. The program covered almost all facilities
emitting over four tons per year of nitrogen oxides or sulfur ox-
ides, and by 1998 more than $42 million in trades had taken
place among the three hundred facilities in the program. 170
Similar systems for volatile organic chemicals were instituted
in Illinois, New Jersey, and Michigan. 171
2. Implementing the New NAAQS
In the rulemaking on the new ozone and particulate stan-
dards, EPA had asked for comments on the implementation is-
sues. The comments were voluminous-even the index to the
comments is two inches thick. 172
166. See John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 250-51 (1990).
167. Latin, supra note 147, at 1689.
168. See Thomas Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE
L.J. 931, 984 (1997).
169. See Stewart, supra note 141, at 105.
170. See Daniel P. Selmi, Transforming Market Incentives from Theory to Re-
ality, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10695 (1994).
171. Stewart, supra note 141, at 107.
172. See Oren, supra note 135, at 10034.
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Implementing the new ozone and PM standards presented
special challenges. First, both pollutants are capable of travel-
ing very long distances, posing difficulties under a statute that
focuses on state-by-state regulation. For example, ozone and
PM problems in New York City are partially due to emissions in
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and even Indiana. 173 Second,
based on experience with other pollution programs in states like
California, EPA concluded that ten thousand dollars per ton is
the limit on what people are willing to pay to control nitrogen
oxides or hydrocarbons. 174 Hence, to be feasible, implementa-
tion would have to work within this limit.
The same day that the new air quality standards were is-
sued, President Clinton took the unusual step of releasing a
memorandum to EPA about implementation. 175 Besides dis-
cussing some of the timing problems in implementing the new
standards, the memo contains some intriguing substantive fea-
tures. It stresses regional strategies rather than the traditional
state implementation plans:
For the past 2 years the EPA has been working with the 37 most
eastern States through the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
(OTAG) in the belief that reducing interstate pollution will help
all areas in the OTAG region attain the NAAQS. A regional ap-
proach can reduce compliance costs and allow many areas to
avoid most traditional nonattainment planning requirements....
If the States choose to establish a regional emission cap-and-trade
system, modeled on the current acid rain program, reductions can
be obtained at a lower cost. The EPA will encourage and assist
the States to develop and implement such a program. Most im-
portant, based on the EPA's review of the latest modeling, a re-
gional approach . . . will allow the vast majority of areas that
currently meet the 1-hour standard but would not otherwise meet
the new 8-hour standard to achieve healthful air quality without
additional local controls. 176
173. Thurston, supra note 71, at 37. For this reason, NAAQS change must be
considered in tandem with EPA's "NOx SIP call" and its handling of § 126 peti-
tions. See Luneburg, supra note 2, at 28-35, 41-46.
174. See Evans, supra note 87, at 65.
175. Implementation of Revised Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particu-
late Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,421 (July 18, 1997). See also Luneburg, supra note 2,
at 25 (describing Clinton's directive as a surprise to outside observers).
176. Implementation of Revised Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particu-
late Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,425.
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As for the particulate standard, the memo stressed that no
control measures can be put in place until a new monitoring
network can determine current air levels of fine particulates. 177
In the meantime, EPA would issue "unclassifiable" designations
that would not require any nonattainment measures until mon-
itoring was complete. 178 The acid rain program could reduce
particulate levels, reducing the projected nonattainment prob-
lem by one-third. 179 The memo also attempted to cap compli-
ance costs:
It was agreed that $10,000 per ton of emission reduction is the
high end of the range of reasonable cost to impose on sources.
Consistent with the State's ultimate responsibility to attain the
standards, the EPA will encourage the States to design strategies
for attaining the PM and ozone standards that focus on getting
low cost reductions and limiting the cost of control to under
$10,000 per ton for all sources. Market-based strategies can be
used to reduce compliance costs. The EPA will encourage the use
of concepts such as a Clean Air Investment Fund, which would
allow sources facing control costs higher than $10,000 a ton for
any of these pollutants to pay a set annual amount per ton to fund
cost-effective emissions reductions from non-traditional and small
sources.180
Finally, the memorandum stressed the need for on-going re-
search into the health effects of fine pollutants and the possible
benefits of ground-level ozone in blocking ultraviolet light.' 8 '
Complex timing issues complicate implementation of the
new NAAQS even more.18 2 Primary air quality standards must
be attained within five years of EPA's determination that an
area is out of compliance; EPA can provide a five-year extension
after considering the severity of the nonattainment and the fea-
177. See id. at 38,427-28.
178. Id. at 38,427.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 38,429.
181. Implementation of Revised Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particu-
late Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,430. The memorandum also suggested the creation
of a special "transitional" designation, with less onerous legal obligations, for areas
meeting the current ozone standard but out of compliance with the new ones; the
validity of this transitional designation is controversial. See Oren, supra note 135,
at 10037.
182. These issues are analyzed detail in Oren, supra note 135.
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sibility of controlling the pollution.183 With regard to the new
ozone and particulate standards, Congress stepped in to further
postpone the deadlines. Title VI of the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21st Century84 allows EPA to postpone nonattain-
ment designations for fine particulates until the end of 2005; it
also gave a one-year extension on nonattainment designations
for ozone. 85 With respect to the ozone standard, as we saw in
Part III, considerable confusion also exists about how to relate
the statutory timetable for achieving the old standards with a
schedule for the new standards. The Supreme Court rejected
the EPA's proposal as unreasonable, but the court left it up to
EPA on remand to come up with a more acceptable solution. 8 6
The upshot is that serious implementation efforts will not
begin for particulates until 2005 and probably will not end until
2015.187 The timetable for ozone compliance is even less clear.
The Clinton Administration had stressed the need for creativity
in devising new implementation strategies; we can expect the
Bush Administration to place even greater emphasis on cost
sensitivity and state initiatives in implementation.
V. REGULATORY REFORM REVISITED
With the benefit of this deeper understanding of environ-
mental implementation, we return to the debate over regulatory
reform. As we will see, although advocates of regulatory reform
have some legitimate concerns about environmental law, their
chosen tools are often irrelevant to the realities of environmen-
tal regulation.
A. Cost-benefit Analysis and Dynamic Environmental
Regulation
Support for cost-benefit analysis extends beyond hardcore
opponents of environmental regulation. One moderate advocate
of cost-benefit analysis is Cass Sunstein. He observes: "[Ilt
183. See Langworthy, supra note 90, at 10503.
184. Transportation Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6101-04, 112 Stat.
463-465 (1998).
185. Langworthy, supra note 90, at 10504.
186. Some possible EPA responses are discussed in Luneburg, supra note 2, at
56-64.
187. See id. at 28.
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seems both natural and sensible to assess further reductions in
terms of their cost."l18 For instance, he points out that if the
expense of reducing sulfur dioxide by one part per million is
"trivial, then the reduction is almost certainly worthwhile," but
matters look very different when benefits are "highly uncertain"
and "the cost would run into the tens of billions of dollars."18 9
According to Sunstein, "it is impossible to assess 'safety' in a
cost vacuum," so that "[i]n general, cost-benefit analysis should
be followed, acknowledging that it will raise some hard ques-
tions of value."190 Consequently, he advocates what might be
considered a "kinder and gentler" version of cost-benefit analy-
sis that leaves some room for unquantified values. 191
This is a plausible argument, and it is not one that can be
dismissed as simply insensitive to noneconomic values or hos-
tile to the regulatory state. But, as Sunstein himself has recog-
nized, the realities of the implementation may provide the best
argument against using cost-benefit analysis to determine the
standards.192
As we saw in Part IV (A), environmental implementation
tends to be a long and twisted road. The Court recognized in
American Trucking that cost is a substantial concern during im-
plementation.' 93 The statute permits cost to be taken into ac-
count in a variety of contexts: in excusing individual sources
from compliance where their continued operation is economi-
cally critical, in setting standards for new factories and for auto-
mobiles, and in setting certain other emissions reductions. 94
But this is really only the tip of the iceberg. For instance, as
188. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 316.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 378.
191. See id. at 370. Some sense of what he has in mind can be found in his
earlier work. He has called for a two-part process, the first stage consisting of a
quantitative cost-benefit analysis, while the second would introduce other values,
if any are relevant, that cost-benefit analysis leaves out. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22.
Just how costs and benefits are defined would depend in part on the type of stat-
ute. For statutes like pollution regulations, which are designed to prevent harms
to third parties and deal with collective action problems, it may argue that there is
much to be said in favor of a quantified cost-benefit analysis. See Sunstein, supra
note 42, at 369-70 (1999). A similar approach to cost-benefit analysis is ably de-
fended in Adler and Posner, supra note 22.
192. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 378.
193. See ATA III, 531 U.S. 457, 466-68 (2001).
194. See id.
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discussed in Part IV (B), the new ozone and particulate stan-
dards will be implemented with careful attention to cost, includ-
ing some innovative economic mechanisms. Thus, in reality,
the statute is not the cost-blind behemoth that its detractors
fear.
Setting goals without regard to cost, while attending to
costs in the implementation process, has several advantages.
First, it is responsive to the strong value our society places on
public health and safety. Chris Schroeder, who is generally
skeptical about the desirability of an environmental baseline,
has argued that such a baseline is legitimate in the field of pub-
lic health. "When environmental harms pose a discernible risk
to human life or threaten serious adverse health effects," he ob-
serves, we can "discern a public favoring maximum feasible en-
vironmental controls." 195 He criticizes cost-benefit analysis for
taking a reductionist approach to human life, emphasizing that
no public official has ever been willing to stand up to say that a
regulation's cost exceeded the monetary value of human life. 196
Thus, he says, our laws should embrace the pricelessness of
human life, even though tradeoffs will be necessary, because
there is an "enormous difference between explicitly declaring
human life to have finite value and implicitly doing so."'197 The
current scheme, then, allows us to reaffirm our commitment to
the value of human life, while allowing us to respect the limits
of feasible regulation.
Second, cost-benefit analysis has limited utility in the earli-
est stages of this lengthy, evolving process. In his concurrence
in American Trucking, Justice Breyer stresses the mismatch be-
tween cost-benefit analysis and the concept of technology-
forcing:
[Tihe statute's technology-forcing objective makes regulatory ef-
forts to determine the costs of implementation both less important
and more difficult. It means that the relevant economic costs are
speculative, for they include the cost of unknown future technolo-
gies. It also means that efforts to take costs into account can
195. Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1909 (2000).
196. Id. at 1910.
197. Id. at 1911.
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breed time-consuming and potentially unresolvable arguments
about the accuracy and significance of cost estimates. 198
Given the unusually long delays that will attend implementa-
tion of the ozone and particulate standards, trying to foresee
technological developments is even more treacherous. 199 Thus,
a cost-benefit analysis would involve considerable guesswork
about technology.
But technological change is only part of the problem. Com-
pliance also is likely to involve the use of innovative legal mech-
anisms, such as regional marketable permits, compliance funds,
and other programs that have not yet been conceived. 200 Pro-
jecting compliance costs under these circumstances is, to say
the least, highly speculative. In the meantime, our understand-
ing of the benefits of the regulation will improve over time. For
example, we will not have accurate data on current levels of fine
particulates until a new monitoring program is in place, and
our knowledge of health effects will also be improved as current
research programs bear fruit. Indeed, as our information im-
proves, the standards may once again be readjusted. Milking
our current database for the last drop of information relating to
costs and benefits of the NAAQS would be wasteful. It makes
far more sense to set a target, start down the road toward meet-
ing it, and readjust our goals and our compliance methods as we
go along.
Given the reality of delayed and/or partial compliance, cost-
benefit analysis might not be the optimal government strategy
even if our sole goal was economic efficiency and even if cost-
benefit analysis produced clear results (which often it does not).
The fact that the standards are sometimes too harsh (that is,
compliance costs are too high compared with benefits) may be
perfectly reasonable given the existence of widespread regula-
tory slippage. In effect, the standards may merely be the gov-
ernment's opening demand in negotiations, and the final
bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other side. If the
government began the negotiations with an "optimal" regula-
tory bid (optimal in the sense that implementation would maxi-
198. ATA III, 531 U.S. at 492-93.
199. See Jonathon H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental
Protection, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 659 (2001).
200. See id. at 678.
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mize net economic benefits), the ultimate bargain would
probably be too favorable to the regulated party. Thus, the crit-
icism of regulatory standards is undermined once we recognize
that the standards are often only partially implemented.201
In short, given the realities of environmental regulation,
the conventional regulatory system may work better in practice
than it does on paper. Cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand,
may have less ability to improve the process than an economist
theorist would expect. At any given time, no single decision-
maker has either the knowledge or the power to set the future
path of policy. Sometimes a rough cost-benefit analysis may be
useful, especially in making plans for implementation. But
overall, the performance of the system depends on the skill and
intelligence of the regulators and on their ability to interact
constructively with other key players, rather than on the use of
any specific formalized decision standard. Increased emphasis
on cost-benefit analysis would not radically improve the overall
cost-effectiveness of environmental law.
B. Delegation
The nondelegation doctrine reflects a concern about un-
checked power in the hands of administrators. The concern
about politically unaccountable regulation is legitimate. But
the doctrine itself seems irrelevant to modern environmental
law for several reasons.
First, to the extent that the nondelegation doctrine calls for
more congressional oversight of the EPA, that is like a demand
for shipping more snow to the Eskimos. We currently have vo-
201. Similarly, attacks on the "one size fits all" nature of regulation also lose
some of their force once the compliance process is understood. Compliance costs
and environmental impacts affect enforcement and compliance levels. Industries
or localities with unusually high compliance costs have a greater incentive to resist
government demands, and those high costs may also have political ramifications
such as lost jobs or declining tax base that might limit the government's regulatory
enthusiasm. On the other hand, more severe or more visible environmental im-
pacts will create more pressure on the government for enforcement of the stan-
dards, and make a citizen suit more likely. Consequently, enforcement probably
will be strictest for sources with low compliance costs and high environmental im-
pacts, and weakest for sources with high costs and low impacts. This is more or
less the kind of regime an economist would recommend in the place of the suppos-
edly uniform standards, though admittedly the individual tailoring is highly
imprecise.
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luminous, complex environmental laws, full of many pages of
specificity and details. The Clean Air Act, for instance, is com-
parable in details and complexity to the income tax statute.
Rather than being left adrift without legislative guidance, EPA
often seems to be drowning in a sea of legislative micro-
management.
Second, at the specific stage of setting environmental stan-
dards, some degree of agency discretion seems unavoidable.
Unless Congress is going to set the standards itself, which it
seems ill-equipped to do, the agency will be forced to make
highly contestable judgment calls. Such judgment calls would
be required regardless of what technique the agency embraced
for setting standards. Forcing the EPA to rely on cost-benefit
analysis would not end the need for these judgment calls. Cost-
benefit analysis inevitably allows considerable flexibility for
several reasons: the uncertainty associated with most of the
risks, the difficulties of monetizing benefits, the dispute about
how to reduce future costs and benefits to present value, and
the frequent inaccuracy of cost projections. 2 2 All of these fac-
tors are exacerbated when setting NAAQS, which are based on
evaluation of cutting-edge epidemiological research. Achieving
the NAAQS would produce a range of health, mortality, and en-
vironmental benefits that are hard to monetize, will not have
their full effects for many years, and will have costs that are
dependent upon technological change and negotiation of regula-
tory techniques. Thus, adopting cost-benefit analysis as the
regulatory standard would only modestly help to limit agency
discretion.
Third, the delegation doctrine does not address the real
problems of accountability in the current regulatory system.
Setting national environmental standards is a high profile, big-
stakes action, certain to attract the full attention of Congress,
the White House, the press, and the affected parties. It is also
subject to careful judicial review. The implementation process,
in contrast, is often piecemeal, involves obscure procedural mat-
ters, and is as likely to happen through quiet negotiation as
open public deliberation. In short, implementation decisions
202. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 83-91. See also Heinzerling, supra note 29
(demonstrating the contestability of cost/benefit estimates for specific regulations).
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are likely to "come under the radar screen." This creates seri-
ous problems of accountability and transparency. However, ap-
plying the nondelegation doctrine to the choice of
environmental standards would do nothing to address these
problems.
This is not to say that we should dismiss the concerns moti-
vating the desire to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine. 20 3
Maintaining the legitimacy of the implementation process is a
serious concern among environmental scholars today, particu-
larly those who are seeking to define a "third way" of environ-
mental regulation. 20 4 Part IV demonstrated how far the
regulatory process has often deviated from the public, formal
standards supposedly required by law. Important policy is
often made through regulatory inaction, settlement of litigation,
and other techniques that operate outside of full public scru-
tiny. Because these techniques often operate on an ad hoc ba-
sis, they may also lead to incoherent public policy unless they
are carefully used. Moreover, these techniques do not always
contain the usual opportunities for public input or the normal
mandates for deliberative decisionmaking. They take place, in
other words, very much in the shadow of the law, not in the
light of public deliberation. In one way or another, the same
problems have plagued various reinvention efforts, which have
been repeatedly criticized for their lack of procedural regularity
and public accountability. 20 5 On the other hand, if properly
used, negotiation can actually increase the legitimacy of the
system. Recent evidence suggests that negotiated policymaking
can actually function so as to increase the perceived legitimacy
of the outcomes, provided the process is designed correctly.20 6
However, once again the delegation doctrine is unlikely to prove
very helpful.
203. Somewhat similar concerns are presented by settlements and consent de-
crees, which prevent a full airing of legal issues in court. See generally Jody Free-
man, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 200 (2000).
204. For recent discussion of these efforts, see Daniel Esty, Next Generation
Environmental Law: A Response to Richard Stewart, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 183 (2001);
FARBER, supra note 4, at 183-98; Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environ-
mentalism, 48 KAN. L REV. 801 (2000); Stewart, supra note 141.
205. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
206. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 60 (2000).
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Those who seek to reform regulation must first understand
regulatory realities. The system has genuine problems, but
those problems are not best addressed by changing the formal
rules that govern issuance of environmental standards. In-
stead, reforms should focus on implementation. Critics of the
current regulatory system are right that the system cannot
function effectively according to its original design, which con-
templated direct translation of standards into compliance. EPA
needs flexibility in designing creative implementation methods,
but the process needs to be more transparent to public scrutiny.
Cost-benefit analysis can help guide the choice between imple-
mentation methods; however, we also need to improve other
parts of our information base as illustrated by the new monitor-
ing system required for the fine particulate standards. Critics
are also right to worry about whether EPA's decisions are demo-
cratically accountable. But again, the biggest problems are in
the implementation process, where we need to ensure against
sweetheart deals for industry or overzealous catering to envi-
ronmental groups. 207
In short, room does exist for substantial improvement in
environmental law. We need to continue our search for more
cost effective methods to reach our goals. We need to make the
implementation process more transparent, accountable, and co-
herent. Unfortunately, much of the current debate over regula-
tory reform is misdirected. The debate has focused far too much
on the initial regulatory stage in which standards are created.
But, much of the real action is elsewhere. If environmental
scholarship is to be relevant to the problems of environmental
regulation, we need to change our focus. It is time to bring the
debate about regulatory reform into line with regulatory
realities.
207. See Freeman, supra note 203, at 198-99, 207.
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